Israel-Egypt Peace Agreement of 1979

What was the Israel-Egypt Peace Agreement of 1979?

Anwar Sadat, Jimmy Carter and Menachem Begin at Signing of Egypt-Israel Peace Agreement, March 26, 1979

Photo ? State of Israel

Anwar Sadat, Jimmy Carter and Menachem Begin
at Signing of Egypt-Israel Peace Agreement, March 26, 1979

The Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt in 1978 led to a negotiated peace between those two nations, signed in Washington DC on March 26, 1979, the first between Israel and any of its Arab neighbors. Israel had a consistent policy since its founding in 1948 that called for direct, one-to-one negotiations as the method of resolving disputes with the Arab countries, but until Sadat brought Egypt to the table no Arab country had been willing to even talk to Israel.

Sadat and Begin shared the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize for their historic agreements. However, the initiative was far from universally popular in other Arab countries or even Sadat’s own country, Egypt. Other Arab nations, and especially the Palestinians, saw Egypt’s agreement with Israel as a stab in the back, leaving them weaker and with less bargaining leverage against Israel. Without Egypt, the “united Arab front” had no credibility. Sadat became isolated in the Arab world and increasingly unpopular at home, conditions that finally led to his assassination in 1981.

The Israel-Egypt peace treaty was signed in Washington on March 26, 1979. It contains nine articles, a military annex, an annex dealing with the relation between the parties, agreed minutes interpreting the main articles of the treaty, among them Article 6, the withdrawal schedule, exchange of ambassadors, security arrangements and the agreement relating to the autonomy talks. The latter issue was contained in a letter addressed by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to President Carter.

In a separate Israel-US Memorandum of Agreement, dated the same day, the US spelled out its commitments to Israel in case the treaty is violated, the role of the UN and the future supply of military and economic aid to Israel.

The terms of the treaty required both countries to stop all hostile activity and demilitarize the Sinai. Israel withdrew to the pre-1967 border, giving up military bases, settlements, roads and other infrastructure as well as the Sinai oil fields. Israel, which had repeatedly been the target of shipping blockades, military assaults, and terrorist attacks staged from the Sinai, made far greater economic and strategic sacrifices in giving up Sinai than Egypt did in “normalizing” relations with Israel.

A permanent international border was established between the two countries. Furthermore, a process of normalization began, including exchange of diplomatic representatives and mutual agreements in the areas of trade, economy, tourism and mail.

Since the signing of the treaty, Egypt has stood by its commitments, even after President Sadat was assassinated by Muslim extremists. The Israel-Egypt peace pact was denounced by all other Arab states and no further progress was made toward an end the Israel-Arab conflict until the Madrid Conference in 1991.

In longer retrospect, the terms of the treaty can be seen to have set an unfortunate precedent. Egypt had been an aggressor against Israel four times and had lost four times. Israel was the country that had been attacked four times and had won four times. But under the peace treaty, Israel returned to the aggressor, Egypt, everything the aggressor had lost. This had never been done before in the long history of warfare between nations, and is very bad policy because it makes aggression a “no lose” bet for the aggressor country. The Israel-Egypt agreement set expectations for all the later peace negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries that have repeatedly tried to destroy it, not to mention the Palestinian Arabs, so they are all looking for the same style of “no lose” treaty.

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§ 2 Responses to Israel-Egypt Peace Agreement of 1979

  • Arab says:

    “In longer retrospect, the terms of the treaty can be seen to have set an unfortunate precedent. Egypt had been an aggressor against Israel four times and had lost four times. Israel was the country that had been attacked four times and had won four times. But under the peace treaty, Israel returned to the aggressor, Egypt, everything the aggressor had lost. This had never been done before in the long history of warfare between nations, and is very bad policy because it makes aggression a “no lose” bet for the aggressor country. The Israel-Egypt agreement set expectations for all the later peace negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries that have repeatedly tried to destroy it, not to mention the Palestinian Arabs, so they are all looking for the same style of “no lose” treaty.”

    The passage above does seem to have a narrow view of what Israel had gained as a result of the treaty. The treaty provided Israel a chance to trade with Egypt, largely for oil, as well as remove the biggest threat to them in that region. It also allowed Israel, by appeasing Egypt, to split the Arab nations even more so than they already were. So all in all the treaty was a massive gain for the Israelis even if they did give back large plots of land that they had ‘won’ as a result of wars.

  • Chavi says:

    @Arab

    In exchange for a landmass that is double the size of Israel today, triple if you exclude the West Bank and Gaza, Israel received a promise of oil. It’s a lot easier to stop trading oil than it is to unwithdraw from land. Note that in 2011 Egypt’s Finance Minister claimed that the 1979 peace treaty does not obligate Egypt to sell gas to Israel.

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